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Abstract 
 
In social dilemmas, leading a team by making heroic efforts may prove costly, 
especially if the followers are not adequately motivated to make similar sacrifices. 
Attempting to understand what motivates these seemingly selfless individuals to 
lead, we report the results of a two-stage public good experiment with endogenous 
timing.  Even though it turns out to be costly on average, a large proportion of our 
subjects volunteer to lead.  Our findings suggest that a fraction of these leaders are 
socially concerned, while others expect to distill some personal gain, possibly of 
non-pecuniary nature.  The composition of the team also matters, as publicizing 
certain attributes of a subject’s teammates has an impact on her decision to lead.  
Lastly, though voluntary leaders improve efficiency in their team, they are not 
necessarily more influential than randomly imposed leaders.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Among the major commitments to be a leader, Michael C. Jensen insists on the following: 
"Be committed to delaying gratification"(Jensen, 2005), adding that, "the message is the 
same as that for physical conditioning, no pain, no gain." (Ibid, p.3).  Leadership, which 
typically differs from hierarchical authority, certainly requires energy and patience, but 
above all, it often requires self-sacrifice, since it is not always associated with personal 
pecuniary gains.  Yet, voluntary leadership is frequently observed in various forms, such as 
in work teams, public research institutes, classrooms, and associations.  A natural question 
thus arises:  If leading is costly, why are some people willing to pay the price? 
In this paper, we study the motivations guiding the emergence of voluntary leadership and 
report the results of an experiment based on a two-stage public good game that reproduces 
the essential features of teamwork within the context of a social dilemma.  In order to 
highlight the motives of leaders, we allow subjects to make a single contribution in one of 
two stages.  Except in a control treatment where the timing is random, subjects are free to 
identify when they would like to contribute, either in the first stage, before others (as a 
leader), or in the second stage (as a follower), after having observed any first-stage 
contribution.  Once all contributions are determined, they are made public information 
among all group members along with each participant’s earnings.  
Though all participants have the right to volunteer to lead, we allow at most a single 
participant to emerge as the actual leader of a group.  With several volunteers, the actual 
leader is randomly selected among these candidates.  We ask all volunteers to determine 
how much they would like to contribute if they were leaders.  Eliminated candidates are 
allowed to revise their contributions, after having observed the actual leader’s effort just 
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like any other follower.  This artifact permits us to glimpse into how leader candidates 
would act as followers, in effect letting us examine their motives more thoroughly.   
In this setup, cooperation is voluntary as the leaders lack any coercive or punitive powers.  
The leader’s earnings are directly linked to how much she can inspire others to contribute.  
We deliberately consider a simple linear public good game where self-oriented subjects 
would choose to free ride by contributing nothing to the public account, in order to 
distinguish between different explanations.  Indeed, using a timing game similar to ours, 
Varian (1994) hypothesizes that those who value the public good least would have an 
incentive to move first by making small contributions, transferring the burden of funding 
the public good to the more concerned followers.  Therefore, self-interested subjects are 
expected to have low levels of contributions in either role.   
Leading may also be motivated by a subject’s social orientation.  For example, altruists 
may be willing to lead and sacrifice their own well-being in order to raise the welfare of 
others.  Andreoni (1990) suggests that seemingly altruistic behavior may also be provoked 
by positive emotions, i.e. “warm-glow,” experienced by publicly contributing to a socially 
beneficial cause.  Furthermore, as all contributions are made public at the end of the game, 
socially concerned subjects, whether they are leaders or not, may also be willing to teach 
their teammates that full cooperation is a payoff maximizing strategy.  Others, like Glazer 
and Konrad (1996) and Harbaugh (1998), suggest that large donations in the PG game may 
be credible demonstrations of an individual’s underlying characteristics such as status. 
The previous discussion reveals that being a leader or a follower should have little or no 
impact on the amount contributed by those who are completely self absorbed, altruistic, 
concerned with the group outcome, or those who simply want to show off.  However, 
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opportunistic subjects may have an incentive both to pose themselves as leader candidates 
and to revise their contributions downwards when rejected.  Indeed, Huck and Rey-Biel 
(2006) suggest that leadership may arise endogenously if some agents dislike effort 
differentials and have a preference to conform.  The expectation that followers will 
conform to generous initial contributions, as first proposed by Sugden (1984), may also 
appear attractive to opportunistic individuals.   Similarly, some individuals may value being 
influential, or having a positive personal impact in one’s own group (Duncan, 2004).1  
Whether they are guided by opportunism or a taste for influence, these subjects should 
contribute more as leaders than as followers.  
The first contribution of our paper is to analyze the emergence of leadership in an 
endogenous timing game and to identify its cost.  We also search for evidence of various 
types of motivations in the decision to lead, without pretending to weigh their importance. 
Notably, this is facilitated by studying how leader candidates respond to being eliminated. 
A second contribution of our work is to analyze whether the self-selection of leaders is 
better predicted by the subjects’ inherent characteristics or by their environment.  The first 
alternative refers to the psychological theory of traits (Terman, 1904; Cowley, 1931; Judge 
et al., 2002).  The second alternative focuses on the interactions between subjects and refers 
to the behavioral theory of leadership (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978).  In our Attribute 
treatment, subjects are informed about the gender and charitable behavior of their team 
members before deciding on moving or waiting.  By comparing the Benchmark and 
Attribute treatments, we examine whether making these attributes visible conditions the 
decision to lead.  In addition, we administered the Five-Factor Personality Inventory Test, 
which allows us to correlate the decision to lead with the personality of the subjects.    
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A third contribution of our paper is related to the impact of voluntary leadership on 
efficiency.  On the one hand, those who choose to lead voluntarily are probably more 
intrinsically motivated to contribute than random leaders, possibly resulting in higher own 
contributions and stronger influence on followers.  On the other hand, the sorting effect of 
voluntary leadership may be such that pro-social subjects constitute a lower proportion of 
followers than when roles are allocated at random.  By comparing our benchmark with the 
Imposed-leader treatment, in which the leader is chosen randomly, we aim to determine 
which effect dominates and which organizational design generates the highest efficiency.   
Our paper constitutes the first attempt to empirically investigate the motives underlying the 
self-selection of leaders in public good games, with a control for personality characteristics 
and an analysis of the leaders' influence controlling for the endogeneity of the leader's 
selection.   
Our main findings are that a high proportion of subjects are willing to lead although leading 
turns out to be costly on average.  The timing decision is influenced by the subjects’ 
gender, generosity and openness, but other personality factors have no significant 
predictive power.  Donations seem to be interpreted as a signal of subjects’ willingness to 
contribute.  Therefore, context matters since being surrounded with generous subjects 
seems to enhance a subject’s own willingness to be the leader and to contribute more.  We 
also provide evidence of the heterogeneity of motives.  Notably, using a cluster analysis, 
we distinguish between selfish, opportunistic, and socially oriented leaders.  Moreover, 
among all leader candidates who were rejected, males seem to be more willing to revise 
their contributions downwards, suggesting that they are either more concerned to maintain 
a social image of being influential, or more opportunistic, which is less likely as leading 
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turns out to be costly on average.  Lastly, we confirm that both the presence of a leader and 
her effort have a strong impact on total contributions in a group.  Leadership-by-example 
can thus support more efficient outcomes as suggested theoretically (Hermalin, 1998; Arce, 
2001).  Voluntary leaders increase efficiency because they contribute more than imposed 
leaders.  However, due to the sorting effect, they are not necessarily more influential. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the related 
experimental literature.  Section 3 details our experimental design and the procedures. 
Section 4 displays the main results and Section 5 discusses the results and concludes. 
 
II. RELATED EXPERIMENTAL LITERATURE 
Hermalin (1998) proposes a theory of leadership-by-example in which a leader receives 
private information regarding the returns from a public good.  According to this 
explanation, the leader signals the state of nature to her uninformed followers.  Most 
experimental research on leadership has focused on such an asymmetric information 
framework, in which a randomly chosen leader receives private information.  These studies 
have verified the transmission of information between the informed leaders and uninformed 
followers (Andreoni, 1998; Versterlund, 2003; Potters et al., 2005, 2007; Meidinger and 
Villeval, 2003; Moxnes and van der Heijden, 2003). One can find other examples of the 
positive influence of early announcements and contributions on later contributions in the 
empirical literature on donations, including Silverman et al. (1984), List and Lucking-
Reiley (2002), and Shang and Croson (2007).  Testing a sequential public good game with 
ex ante symmetric information and random leaders, Gächter and Renner (2006) show that 
leaders act as “belief managers” and exert a long-lasting influence on followers’ beliefs. 
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There is no difference between groups with and without a leader in that the same beliefs 
trigger the same behavior; but in the groups with a leader, the latter shapes the beliefs. 
Only a few experiments address the idea of endogenous leadership.  In a context of ex ante 
symmetric information, Gächter and Renner (2005) design a game in which a leader is 
designated based on his contribution behavior in earlier parts of the game.  Efficiency is 
enhanced when those who were once free-riders are reintroduced as leaders in later stages, 
since they increase their contributions, possibly anticipating that the followers will 
reciprocate.  Kumru and Versterlund (2005) assign the role of leader based on a subjects' 
performance in a quiz.  They observe that the leader’s influence is positively correlated 
with her status.  When some subjects are more informed than others and group members are 
allowed to vote in favor of either a sequential game with informed leaders or a 
simultaneous game, Potters et al. (2005) show that most players choose the sequential 
game, in order to maximize their own welfare.  Similarly, Güth et al. (2007) find only 40% 
of groups succeeding to appoint a leader, when subjects vote on whether they want a leader 
or not.  Though these studies allow collective decision-making, leaders do not necessarily 
self-select their roles.  Voluntary leadership is clearly an original aspect of our paper. 
Our design is closer to endogenous timing games.  Huck et al. (2002) investigate a duopoly 
game in which a firm chooses between moving first or moving after observing the decision 
of the other firm.  Though economic theory predicts the emergence of endogenous 
Stackelberg leadership, they find that subjects are more willing to settle for Cournot 
outcomes.  Other experimental tests of leadership in duopoly games can be found in 
Fonseca et al. (2006).  Like in these games, our subjects decide to move first or second. In 
contrast with these studies, we consider a public good game in which economic theory 
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predicts that only those who value the public good least, that is self-interested subjects, 
should move first with no or very little contributions. 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
Design 
We use three variants of a simple three-player sequential public good game.  Each session 
consists of 30 periods and subjects are re-matched after each period.  At the end of the 
game, subjects are administered a personality test. 
The Benchmark treatment.  In the beginning of each period, each of the three group 
members is endowed with 20 units.  This endowment can be used to contribute to a public 
account or to be kept on a private account.  All funds in the public account pay an equal 
positive return to each member of the group.   
The game is two-staged.  In the first stage, each group member decides on whether she is 
willing to lead the group ("to make his contribution decision immediately").  Leading the 
group means contributing first to the public account and making this contribution visible to 
the other group members before they make their own contribution decisions.  The leader 
candidate indicates the amount of his contribution.  In the second stage, those subjects who 
chose not to contribute before others (the followers) are first informed about their leader’s 
contribution, if any, and then asked to specify the amount they would like to contribute to 
the public account simultaneously.  The marginal per capita return from a contribution to 
the public account is 0.5.  The payoff of subject i is therefore given by:   
                         (1) 
 
π i = 20 − ci +α c j
j=1
3∑ withα = 0.5
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At the end of each period, the group members are informed about the individual 
contributions of all members and their personal payoffs. 
We do not allow more than one leader to move first.2  Given that the decision to lead is 
made simultaneously, there are three distinct possibilities.  If no participant is willing to 
lead, the three group members are moved directly to the second stage and contribute 
simultaneously to the public good.  In this case, the game is similar to the standard 
voluntary contribution mechanism game, apart from the fact that the simultaneity is 
achieved endogenously.  If only a single subject is willing to lead, the procedure described 
above applies.  If there are several candidates, a random draw determines the actual leader.  
Only the contribution of the selected candidate is indicated to others.  The first stage 
contribution of an eliminated candidate is not taken into account.  Instead, eliminated 
candidates are treated like followers and allowed to modify their initial proposed 
contributions.  Keeping track of both the initial proposal and the revised contribution 
enables us to examine how eliminated candidates adjust their behavior.  The experimental 
setup is made common knowledge in the instructions (see Appendix). 
Two additional treatments.  Unlike the Benchmark treatment, in which only information 
regarding the individual contributions was provided, the Attribute treatment aims to study 
how the contribution and timing decisions are influenced by other characteristics of group 
members.  It replicates the structure of the Benchmark treatment.  The only difference is 
that in the beginning of each period, the subjects are informed about two attributes of their 
group members that are represented by pictograms on the subjects' screens.  The first 
attribute is gender, which is self-reported by the subject in the beginning of the experiment.  
The second attribute attempts to measure the social orientation of a subject.3  In order to 
 8 
 
proxy social orientation, we allow the subjects to donate real money into a charity.  In the 
beginning of each session after the instructions are read aloud, each subject is given a 
show-up fee of 6 Euros.  Then, subjects are allowed to donate €0 to €6 to a charity of their 
choice.4  The difference between the show-up fee and the donation is kept on the subject's 
account and added to the additional earnings.  The information about the subject’s donation 
is displayed as follows.  If the subject’s donation is above the session average, then a 
yellow circle identifies her. Otherwise, the subject receives a gray circle.5   
We are aware that donations are not an exact measure of a subject’s social orientation or 
generosity.  Indeed, when they make their donations, the subjects know that this 
information will be displayed to others during the session.  A donation may thus be a 
strategic decision.  That is, a subject may want to donate more simply to trick her group 
mates to believe that she will contribute generously.  However, since the displayed circles 
identify above or below average donations in any given session, we expect a yellow circle 
to nevertheless be a relatively good indicator of the subject’s above average generosity. 
In the Imposed-leader treatment, we select a leader at random among the group members.  
As before the leader moves first and the others contribute simultaneously after being 
informed on the leader's contribution.  No information about attributes is displayed.  While 
by contrasting the Benchmark and Attribute treatments we investigate the motives behind 
the self-selection process, by comparing the Benchmark and Imposed-leader treatments, we 
highlight the impact of voluntary leadership on efficiency.   More specifically, we are able 
to analyze whether a voluntary leader contributes more than a designated one and whether 
second movers are more willing to follow a voluntary leader.  
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The theoretical predictions with selfish subjects are similar in all treatments.  The subgame 
perfect equilibrium is to contribute nothing in the second stage since every individual is 
better off by keeping his endowment for himself regardless of what the others allocate to 
the public good, since the marginal return from contributing to the public account is lower 
than the return from the private account (α < 1).   In contrast, the efficient outcome is for 
each subject to contribute all her endowment, since the return when all group members 
contribute an additional amount is higher than the return from the private account ( nα > 1). 
A personality test.  At the end of the session, we administered a personality test to our 
subjects to investigate whether specific traits distinguish leaders and followers in the 
endogenous leadership treatments.  We used the French version of the Five-Factor 
Inventory personality test commonly known as the "Big Five"  (NEO-FFI) (see Costa and 
McCrae, 2004; Rolland et al., 1998; Rossier et al., 2003).  This test consists of 60 items, 
presented alternatively in positive and negative phrasing.  It is based on voluntary self-
assessment.  Each subject is given an additional €2 for having completed the test.  
Respondents are asked to consider each item and to decide, using a five-point Likert-type 
scale, whether they agree or disagree with each proposition.  These items provide a concise 
measure of the five dimensions of personality (neuroticism, extraversion, openness, 
agreeableness and conscientiousness) that summarize the personality of an individual 
(Costa and McCrae, 1992).6  
On average, the questionnaire took 15 minutes to be completed.  After the validation of the 
questionnaires, we factored the items for each gender7 and computed a t-score for each 
factor that relates each individual score to the mean and the standard deviation of the 
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sample of participants.  This allows us to compare directly the scores obtained by males and 
females and to include them in our econometric analyses. 
Procedures 
The experiment was computerized by utilizing the REGATE software (Zeiliger, 2000).  
Sessions were conducted in the experimental laboratory of the Groupe d’Analyse et de 
Theorie Economique (GATE) in Lyon, France.  A total of 141 subjects (72 females and 69 
males) were recruited from undergraduate classes in three local engineering and business 
schools.  The subjects had no prior experience with public goods experiments.  We ran 8 
sessions under a stranger matching protocol.8  Each session consisted of three sets of 10 
periods alternating between two treatments.  The ordering of treatments for each session is 
detailed in Table 1.  
Upon arrival, each subject drew a label from a bag, indicating the name of his computer, 
and entered the laboratory.  The instructions (see Appendix) for the preliminary and the 
first parts of the session were distributed and read aloud.  We added a short description of 
each of the three humanitarian NGOs and a form to be filled out by the participants 
requesting a receipt to prove the payment of the total donations to these NGOs.  The 
subjects then filled out a questionnaire enabling to check their understanding of the rules of 
the game.  Questions were answered in private.  The subjects could then decide on the 
amount of their donation to a charity.  Once all the subjects entered their decisions, the 
program matched them randomly.  Groups were reshuffled after each period.  At the end of 
the first (second) set of periods, the instructions of the second (third) part were distributed, 
with no questions allowed.  Last, the personality test was administered and a final question 
was asked about car ownership which answer was used as an (imperfect) index of wealth.9  
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An average session lasted about 70 minutes.  Each point earned during a session was 
convertible to Euro at 80 points = €1.  The participants gave on average €1.04 to a charity.  
They earned an average €15.70, corresponding to the sum of the payoff earned in each 
period and the fraction of the show-up fee they did not donated.  An assistant who was not 
aware of the content of the experiment helped subjects with their donations and payments 
in private, all of which was made common knowledge in the instructions.  This procedure 
was used to prevent any feeling of shame that could have biased the donation behavior if 
the payment was to be made in front of the experimentalist who conducted the sessions.     
IV. RESULTS 
An overview of our results shows that a substantial proportion of subjects are willing to 
lead, in contrast with the equilibrium predictions.  We first focus on the analysis of the 
determinants of the leadership decisions and contributions.  Second, we examine the 
behavior of the eliminated leader candidates.  Third, we concentrate on the influence of 
leaders.  Lastly, we produce a cluster analysis of the behavior of leaders and followers in 
order to push further the investigation of the variety of motives for voluntary leadership.  
Leaders' behavior 
Before we delve into the leaders’ motives, we show that moving first on average entails a 
loss.  Table 2 displays a summary of the descriptive statistics before we present the results 
of a regression analysis. 
Contrary to standard predictions, Table 2 shows that a significant proportion of subjects, 
roughly a quarter of all participants, are willing to lead voluntarily.  Figure 1 displays the 
evolution of this proportion over time by treatment.   
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In the first ten periods, the proportions of subjects who are willing to lead are 33.14% in the 
Benchmark treatment and 35.83% in the Attribute treatment.  Although these proportions 
decline over time, there are still 17.71% of subjects who are willing to lead in the 
Benchmark treatment and 21.67% in the Attribute treatment in the last set of periods.  
Consequently, 57.42% of the groups have a leader in the endogenous treatments and this 
proportion is still 46.38% in the last set of periods. 
Leading voluntarily is common and would not have been too unusual if leaders and 
followers earned similar amounts.  However, our finding is striking since leaders seem to 
willing to forego expected relative losses from contributing first.  A first indication of these 
relative losses is found in the comparison between leaders' and actual followers' average 
contributions in groups with a leader.  Table 2 indicates that the ratio of average leaders' 
contribution to followers' contribution is 2.14 in the Benchmark, 2.26 points in the 
Attribute treatment and 1.92 points in the Imposed-leader treatment.  Table 3 shows the 
evolution of leader candidates' and actual followers' contributions over time and displays 
the ratios between the two values.   
Table 3 indicates that the leaders' contributions decrease less over time than the followers’ 
contributions.  The leaders' influence progressively vanishes and they are less and less paid 
in return for their efforts.  A second indication of leadership costs can be found in the 
analysis of payoffs.  As shown by Table 2 and in accordance with the different contribution 
levels examined above, the leaders earn dramatically less than the followers.  The 
difference is larger when leadership is endogenous.  In the Benchmark, a leader earns on 
average 75% of the follower's payoff.  These values are 74% in the Attribute treatment and 
81% in the Imposed-leader treatment.   
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Being a follower in a group with a leader is clearly preferable, since the average payoffs of 
these participants is superior to average payoffs in groups without any leader (see Table 2). 
A simple explanation for why some subjects are willing to bear the cost of being a leader 
could be that leading is expected to be more profitable than another risky outcome, being in 
a group without any leader.  Our data does not support such a motive.  To see this, note that 
the minimum payoff that a subject can secure is 20 points, which is guaranteed by not 
contributing into the public account.  A quick look at the earnings of leaders in Table 2 
shows that average payoffs dip below this threshold in Benchmark and Attribute 
treatments.  Voluntary leaders are getting less on average than the amount they could 
secure for themselves and they earn slightly less than an average subject without a leader.  
In the Benchmark and Attribute treatments, the leaders’ average earnings are 19.46 and 
19.16 points, respectively, while average earnings in groups with no leader are 20.79 and 
20.56 points, respectively.   
One could object to the previous arguments by saying that they are based on average 
earnings and may not be valid once subjects have had sufficient time to learn how to play 
the game.  Such an argument also seems to be incorrect.  Indeed, if we consider the last set 
of periods only, being a leader demands even a greater sacrifice.  In periods 21 to 30, the 
difference in payoffs between a leader and any member of a group without a leader is 2.14 
points in the Benchmark treatment (instead of 1.32 in the first set of periods) and 1.79 
points in the Attribute treatment (instead of 1.21). Even with these differences in sight, a 
significant proportion of all subjects choose to be a leader.  
These statistics confirm that subjects seem to be willing to sacrifice their potential earnings 
in order to be a leader.  The immediate questions to be answered are therefore the 
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following: Which subjects accept these potential losses? Which conditions intensify their 
willingness to do so? And, what do these leader candidates buy?   
Determinants of the decision to lead.  We study the probability to be willing to lead using 
random-effects probit models accounting for repeated decisions by each subject.  The 
exogenous variables include a time trend to identify the evolution of leadership probability 
over time (period).  We also include the subject's gender, the amount of points donated to a 
charity (donation), the t-scores for each personality factor, and a dummy for car ownership 
to account for wealth effects.  The donation variable is interacted with the gender variable 
for being able to discern the effect of gender on donations (see Eckel and Grossman, 2000).  
It is also interacted with a dummy indicating whether the benchmark treatment is part of a 
sequence including the Imposed-leader treatment ("donation*BIB") because in this 
sequence strategic donations are ruled out.  We also include session dummies, the first 
session being omitted.  In the regression for the Attribute treatment, we also add four 
variables determining the group composition. These variables indicate whether the subject 
is teamed with two low donors (subjects who gave a donation equal or lower than the 
average), two high donors (subjects who donated more than the average), two females, or 
two males.  Table 4 reports the estimations for two models; the first model pools data from 
the endogenous treatments; the second model only considers the Attribute treatment.  
We find that the probability to lead is decreasing over time in both estimations.  This is 
consistent with both a learning hypothesis and the previous finding that the relative cost of 
leading increases over time.  Those who donate a larger amount are more likely to be a 
leader candidate, suggesting that generous individuals are more willing to bear the cost of 
leadership.  Non-strategic donations have no different impact since the coefficient 
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associated with the "donation*BIB" variable is not significant.  This is consistent with the 
descriptive statistics indicating that the average donation amounts to 104.49 points among 
the leader candidates and 79.65 among those subjects who are not candidates.   
A quick look into the gender composition of leader candidates shows that males seem more 
eager to lead than females; 27.46% of males choose to lead, while the corresponding value 
for females is only 23.93%.  But this difference vanishes when attributes are made public. 
The proportion of females who are willing to lead increases from 23.23% in the Benchmark 
to 25.61% in the Attribute treatment.  The same proportion for males is constant in both 
treatments: 27.27% and 27.83%, respectively.   Our regression results reinforce these 
statistics.  Being a male increases the probability to lead significantly, by as much as 10%, 
when we pool data.  Also, the gender difference is no longer significant when we only 
consider the Attribute treatment.  One possible explanation is that females require more 
information about their group members than males to invest in leadership; that is their 
contributions tend to be conditional on other aspects of the game.10  Females who donate 
more are also more likely to lead.  Then, for females a high donation is more strongly 
associated with generosity, which has a positive effect on the likelihood of leading.  As for 
males, the descriptive statistics show that donations tend to be more strategic in nature.11  
We do not find in our data a strong support for the argument that personality factors are 
good predictors of voluntary leadership.  Only openness increases significantly the 
probability to lead when we pool all endogenous treatments together.  The influence of 
openness is consistent with psychological studies of leadership.  Judge et al. (2002) recall 
that in Bass's (1985) analysis, originality, creativity and non-conformism are the primary 
predictors of leadership as they are primarily related to openness.  
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Last, the estimates of the second model show that subjects condition their decision to lead 
on some attributes of their group members.  Indeed, being teamed with two low donors 
reduces the likelihood of running for leadership.  An explanation is that a low donation is 
probably taken as a signal of a lower willingness to contribute.  The reluctance to be a 
“sucker” may then reduce the willingness to lead.  This impact is not symmetric.  Being 
matched with two high donors does not affect the likelihood to run for leadership.  Lastly, 
the gender composition of the group does not affect the willingness to lead. 
Leaders' contributions.  We estimate random effect tobit models by considering the first 
stage contributions of leader candidates as the independent variable and accounting for the  
left and right censuring of the data.  The first model pools the data from all treatments.  The 
second model considers the endogenous treatments and the third one analyzes the Attribute 
treatment.  Table 5 reports the results. 
Table 5 shows that imposed leaders contribute less than voluntary leaders, while making 
the attributes of the team members visible increases the voluntary leaders' contributions.  
These estimations supplement the simple comparison of the proportions of censured data 
across treatments.  In the Imposed-leader treatment, 24% of the leaders contribute nothing 
whereas 22% contribute their full endowment; the respective proportions are 8% and 29% 
in the Benchmark treatment, and 3% and 34% in the Attribute treatment.12   The 
observation that voluntary leaders contribute more than imposed ones can be driven by two 
reasons.  First, less constrained activities may translate into higher efforts (see Falk and 
Kosfeld, 2006; Eriksson et al., 2006).  Second, free riders are sometimes randomly selected 
as leaders in the Imposed-leader treatment.  When personal characteristics of gender and 
donation level are publicly displayed, voluntary leaders condition their decision to lead on 
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their group members’ attributes and are therefore inclined to contribute more than when 
they  are hidden.  
We find a negative time trend in the three regressions: leaders adjust their contributions 
downwards over time.   We also observe that most personal variables have no significant 
impact on the leader's contribution, as if the role of a leader subsumed almost all individual 
characteristics.  In contrast, the characteristics of group members have a significant 
influence on the leader's contribution in the Attribute treatment.  
Eliminated leader candidates' behavior  
When there are several leader candidates, a random draw eliminates all but one.  25% (155 
out of 463) and 26% (87 out of 249) of all candidates have been eliminated in this manner 
in the Benchmark and Attribute treatments, respectively.  When allowed to modify their 
initial contributions after observing the actual leader's contribution, 22% of the eliminated 
candidates revise their contribution upwards and 41% revise downwards.  This revision 
possibility enables us to dig deeper into what may motivate them to be a leader.  An 
immediate question is whether the contributions of eliminated candidates are similar to the 
contributions of self-selected followers.  Figures 2a and 2b contrast the contributions of 
actual leaders, eliminated leader candidates, and self-selected followers for each gender.   
These figures reveal that in general eliminated leaders contribute more than three times 
more than self-selected followers.13  Another striking feature of the contributions depicted 
in Figures 2a and 2b is that in both Benchmark and Attribute treatments, eliminated female 
candidates contribute almost the same amount as actual female leaders while elimination 
seems to have a negative impact on the contributions of male candidates.14  However, we 
need to account for the fact that adjustments may also depend on the actual leader's 
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contribution.  One would expect that, if the contribution of the actual leader is inferior 
(superior) to the initial amount put forth by the candidate, then adjustment should be 
downwards (upwards).  We relate (signed) revision decisions to the leader’s contribution in 
Figure 3.  A negative value in the figure signifies a downward modification, such that the 
revised contribution is less than the original one.  For each gender, we depict average 
modifications in response to inferior and superior contributions by the actual leader. 
Without any surprise, when the actual leader’s contribution is inferior, both males and 
females reduce their contributions, though the (downward) adjustment appears stronger for 
males.  However, when the actual leader’s contribution is superior, females increase their 
contributions and follow the actual leader while eliminated male leaders slightly decrease 
their contributions and do not follow the actual leader. 
To understand the determinants of the revision of an eliminated candidate's contribution, 
we first estimate an ordered probit model with robust standard errors, in which the sign of 
revised amount is the dependent variable, equaling +1 if the revision is upwards, 0 if no 
revision occurs, and -1 if the revision is downwards.  Then, we estimate a GLS model in 
which the amount of the revision is the dependent variable.  We measure the influence of 
the actual leader, controlling for the usual variables.  Table 6 reports these estimations.  
Both regressions confirm that the revision is positively influenced by the amount 
contributed by the actual leader, but that males are less likely to revise their own 
contribution upwards.  This reluctance of males to revise upwards when the actual leader is 
more generous is probably due to the fact that what motivates males to be a leader is 
different than what motivates females.  The premium that males are willing to pay to lead is 
less likely to be motivated by a concern for the group’s welfare, for if that was the case, 
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males, like females, would be eager to follow the actual leader.  This behavior may be 
explained by one’s selfish concern, as the candidate contributes opportunistically to make 
the followers reciprocate generously, or by the candidate’s preference for having a personal 
impact on the welfare of the group (see Duncan (1994)’s model of impact philanthropy).  
The influence of leaders 
Do leaders exert an influence on followers and if so, is this influence stronger when the 
leadership is voluntary?  Influence can be measured in two distinct ways:  First, by 
comparing the average second stage contributions with and without a leader, and, second, 
by stating the followers’ contributions as a share leaders’ contributions.  In groups with no 
leaders, average contributions are 1.84 points in the Benchmark and 1.40 in the Attribute 
treatment.  In groups with a leader, the average followers' contributions are 5.52 points in 
the Benchmark treatment (+200%), 5.23 points in the Attribute treatment and 5.03 points in 
the Imposed-leader treatment (+274%).  This shows that having a leader in a group makes a 
big difference. We observe that a follower matches 47% of the leader's contribution in the 
Benchmark treatment, 44% in the Attribute treatment and 52% in the Imposed-leader 
treatment.  The coefficients of pairwise correlations between the second stage contributions 
and actual leaders’ contributions are 0.38 in the Benchmark treatment, 0.33 in the Attribute 
treatment and 0.48 in the Imposed-leader treatment.  This indicates that voluntary leaders 
do not necessarily exert a stronger influence on their group members. 
This is confirmed by a regression analysis of the followers’ contributions.  We estimate 
random-effects tobit models in which we include either a variable indicating whether the 
group has a leader or not (leader in group) or the actual leader's contribution.  A dummy 
indicates whether the subject has been a leader candidate in the current period (eliminated 
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leader).  We control for the usual variables.  In the first estimation, we pool the data from 
the three treatments and focus on groups with a leader.  In the next two estimations, we 
analyze the data from both endogenous leadership treatments, considering first all groups 
and then only those with a leader.  Table 7 reports these estimations. 
The estimations show that the presence of a leader and the seed contribution, whether the 
role is imposed or not, are all significant determinants of how a follower acts.  Although 
leaders are influential, our first estimation shows that the amount contributed by a follower 
is not significantly different across treatments.  This finding shows that voluntary leaders 
are not more influential than random leaders.  In other words, followers do not reciprocate 
more when the leader has self-selected.  The second and third estimations confirm that in 
the endogenous leadership treatments, eliminated candidates contribute more than other 
followers.  An additional specification for the sole Attribute treatment (not reported here) 
finds that the leader's attributes exert no additional influence. 
Although voluntary leaders are not more influential than random leaders, they contribute 
more on average.  As a consequence, in groups with a leader the average size of the public 
good is greater when leadership is voluntarily determined than when it is randomly 
assigned.  On average, the public good amounts to 22.87 points in the Benchmark, 22.29 
points in the Attribute treatment and 19.71 points in the Imposed-leader treatment.  When 
there are no leaders, the public good is only 5.51 points in the Benchmark and 4.19 points 
in the Attribute treatment.  Efficiency is thus greater when leadership is voluntary and there 
is at least one leader candidate.  When there are no candidates, designating any team 
member as a leader is more efficient than letting all subjects contribute simultaneously. 
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Heterogeneity of behavior towards leadership 
To better understand the diversity of motives behind the decision to lead, we now turn to a 
cluster analysis.  Instead of starting from pre-defined strategies, we derive these strategies 
from an analysis that allows us to identify homogenous groups of subjects following the 
same type of behavior.  In order to partition the sample, we retain three variables that 
summarize each individual’s decisions in the two endogenous leadership treatments: the 
relative frequency of the decisions to lead, the average contribution as a leader candidate, 
the average contribution as a follower.15  We obtain four main clusters.  Table 8 
summarizes the statistics regarding each cluster; for memory, it also reports the average 
donation but this variable is not active in the identification of the clusters. 
Cluster 1 consists of subjects who are less often willing to lead than the rest of the 
population and who contribute little, both as leaders and as followers.   The singularity of 
this group lies mostly in the average first-stage contribution that only represents 45% of the 
average leaders’ contribution in the whole population.  Cluster 2 consists of subjects who 
lead almost as frequently as those in cluster 1, but are characterized both by the maximum 
first-stage contribution (close to full cooperation) and the minimum second-stage 
contribution (close to full free-riding) in the population.  This cluster groups a very few 
number of subjects but it is robust to many alternative specifications of the clusters.  
Cluster 4 is characterized by the highest frequency of the decision to lead (in more than 
43% of the periods), accompanied by a high average first-stage contribution and the highest 
average second-stage contributions.  In this cluster, the average followers’ contribution is 
more than twice as high as that in the whole population.  Cluster 3 represents an 
intermediate category with characteristics close to the averages. 
 22 
 
The vast differences between clusters indicate that there may be several motivations in the 
decision to lead.  Behavior in cluster 1 is close to that predicted by Varian’s model (1994). 
Leaders and followers alike seem to be selfish individuals.  As an additional validation of 
our argument, the average donation in this cluster is low. Having donated the lowest 
average amount among all four clusters, the subjects in cluster 2 essentially act selfishly by 
contributing very little, except when offered the opportunity to have a personal impact on 
the well being of the group.  Assuming that they are motivated either by an urge to 
personally influence others or by opportunism, these subjects are ironically not conditional 
cooperators themselves.  In contrast, the behavior of those in cluster 4 is attributable either 
to altruism or a strong concern for the group outcome, as these subjects lead often, have 
above average contributions, either as a leader or a follower, and donate a large portion of 
their endowments in the beginning of the session.   
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Informal leadership in groups is frequently observed despite the fact that setting a good 
example is not necessarily profitable for the leader.  We test whether in a social dilemma 
game, with free-riding as the dominant strategy, voluntary leadership can emerge without 
any assured benefits or direct communication among participants.  Our design allows 
subjects to choose the timing of their contribution in a linear public good game.  Through 
an artifact, we are able examine how those who show an interest to act first would adjust 
their contributions when forced to move second.  With the aid of various treatments, we 
determine the influence of group members’ characteristics on the decision to lead and we 
compare the efficiency and influence of voluntary leaders to imposed leaders.  
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Our primary finding is that a large proportion of subjects are willing to lead, though they 
earn on average considerably less than followers and even less than those in a group with 
no leader.  The decision to lead is partially determined by the participant’s traits, such as 
the gender, generosity and openness but personality factors have little further explanatory 
power.  Displaying the donation level of one’s group mates has an influence on decision to 
lead: being matched with less generous subjects reduces one’s willingness to contribute 
first.  We claim that the donation information is used to form beliefs about the likely 
attitude of others.  We also show that in groups with a leader, voluntary leadership 
improves efficiency since self-selected leaders contribute more than imposed leaders.  
However, voluntary leaders are not more influential than imposed leaders.  
Both the behavior of eliminated leader candidates and our cluster analysis suggest that there 
may be complementary motives for being a leader and that no single theory is able to 
explain the decision to lead in a social dilemma game.  We identify a fraction of subjects 
who lead frequently and contribute a large proportion of their endowment.  Among these 
cooperators, altruism is a potential explanation, supported by the positive correlation 
between the amount of the donation to a charity and the probability to lead.  It is also 
supported by the number of remaining candidates in the last set of periods though the 
subjects had time to learn the costs of leading.  Cooperators may also be people who are 
concerned by the group outcome and who try to teach others that the payoff maximizing 
strategy for the group is to coordinate on full cooperation.  Both explanations are consistent 
with the fact that the behavior of eliminated candidates in the second stage is closer to 
actual leaders’ than to self-selected followers’ behavior.  However, if altruism can explain 
leading in the last periods, the teaching explanation cannot. 
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In contrast with these socially-oriented motivations, our experiment provides evidence for 
self-interest in the decision to lead.  A fraction of subjects move first and free-ride.  
Selfishness may explain such behavior that gives some support to Varian (1994)’s model. 
Instead of trying to set an example, by moving first these subjects make it clear that the 
burden of contributing to the public good is transferred onto the others.   Another distinct 
group of subjects contribute large amounts as leaders but are much less generous as 
followers.  Though we do not identify a large cluster of such behavior, the examination of 
how eliminated candidates modify their contributions reveals that males are particularly 
prone to act in this manner.  The reason that some subjects are willing to contribute more as 
leaders may be to trigger followers to contribute large amounts themselves, but this is not 
very likely in the long run since, as highlighted above, leading turns out to be costly on 
average. As an alternative explanation, participants may be concerned with maintaining a 
positive public image by appearing as an influential leader.   
These results add to a growing body of experimental research that shows the importance of 
heterogeneity of types in the dynamics of cooperation (Burlando and Guala, 2005; Kurzban 
and Houser, 2005; Bardsley and Moffatt, 2005; Gächter and Fischbacher, 2006).  Once the 
role of the type composition of groups has been accounted for, further research is needed to 
see how the manipulation of group formation could improve the efficiency of leadership.   
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NOTES
                                                 
1 Explaining why blood donations might be adversely influenced by the introduction of material incentives (as 
shown by Titmuss (1970).  Arrow (1972) suggests that charitable behavior may be motivated not merely by a 
desire to increase someone else’s welfare, “but from the fact that the individual himself has contributed to that 
satisfaction,” (p. 348).  These approaches highlight the fact that individual may be interested in what others 
think, bearing close resemblance to the model of Benabou and Tirole (2006) in which individuals are 
concerned with maintaining a positive social image in their reference group. 
2 Allowing several leaders would pose an empirical challenge of measuring their influences in our simple 
setup.  For example, with two leaders with different contributions and attributes, it is not clear which one of 
the two leaders have a greater influence on the third member. Our design also has advantage of allowing us to 
study the revision of contributions between the two stages by eliminated leader candidates.  As will become 
clearer later, this helps us identify what motivates some subjects to become the leader. 
3  The choice of the number of attributes is directed by the willingness to characterize an individual without 
putting his anonymity into question.  The choice of the attributes is driven by the same considerations. 
4 The charities were Handicap International (http://www.handicap-international.org/), Médecins sans 
Frontières (http://www.msf.org/), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
(http://www.unicef.org/).  We offered the choice between three NGOs to avoid that some subjects refuse to 
donate not because of the idea of giving up money but because they dislike a specific organization.   
5 The amount of the donation is not displayed to avoid that people recognize another player after several 
repetitions. 
6 A subject’s neuroticism score helps us distinguish individuals with low self-esteem from those who are 
calm.  The extraversion score opposes outgoing and talkative subjects to inhibited persons while the openness 
score distinguishes original from conservative subjects.  Agreeableness contrasts trusting and forgiving 
individuals to rude ones.  Conscientiousness distinguishes reliable from disorganized subjects. 
7 A high number of successive identical responses is considered as raising doubt on whether the subject 
answered trustfully.  We did not find such cases in our sample, each questionnaire has therefore been used.  
8  7 sessions involved 18 subjects and 1 session involved 15 participants. 
9  Only a small minority of these students is working.  Asking the participants whether they have a job is not 
informative.  Asking about the parents' income gives typically a low response rate.  Ownership of a car is an 
imperfect but indicative measure of resources.  61% of the participants own personally a car (64% of the 
females and 58% of the males). A two-sample test of proportion accepts the null hypothesis of no difference 
between the proportion of car owners among females and males (p=0.47). 
10 The greater conditionality of females' decisions has been observed with respect to the attitudes towards 
competition (see Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini, 2003). 
11 In BIB sequences, in which it is common knowledge that no information about donation will be revealed, 
females donate an average of 73.60 points while males donate much less, an average of 55.38 points. This 
difference vanishes in other sequences, where it is common knowledge that donation information is to be 
made public. In BAB and ABA sequences, females donate 97.02 and males 91.16 points. 
12  The Exogenous treatment is only played in periods 11 to 20.  If we only consider these periods, we still 
observe that the proportions of leaders who contribute nothing are 6% in the Benchmark and 5% in the 
Attribute treatments; the proportions who contribute their full endowment are 38% and 33%, respectively. 
13 We do not have enough independent observations to use systematic non parametric statistics.  An imperfect 
alternative is to use the data from the first three rounds of the pooled endogenous treatments given that most 
people are teamed with new subjects in the beginning of the game.  Mann-Whitney U tests conducted under 
these conditions reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the contributions of an eliminated 
candidate and a (self-selected) follower for both females (p=0.006) and males (p=0.022). 
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p∑
14 Mann-Whitney U tests conducted under the same conditions mentioned in the previous note accept the null 
hypothesis of no difference between an actual leader’s contribution and an eliminated candidate’s revised 
contribution (p=0.385) for females but reject it for males (p=0.009).   
15 We apply the hierarchical Wald method based on the minimization of the intra-group variance 
( ) to identify the clusters. 
Table 1. Ordering of treatments in the experimental sessions 
 
Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 21-30 Nb sessions Nb sujets 
Benchmark  Attribute Benchmark 3 54 
Attribute Benchmark Attribute 2 36 
Benchmark Imposed-leader Benchmark 3 51 
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Table 2. Summary descriptive statistics  
Treatment Benchmark Attribute Imposed-leader 
Number of observations 
Number of leaders (%) 
% of groups with leader 
Groups with a leader (averages) 
       Candidate's contribution 
       Actual leader's contribution  
       Actual follower's contribution 
       Size of the public good  
       Leader's payoff 
       Follower's payoff 
Groups without a leader (averages) 
Contribution 
Size of the public good 
Payoff 
2460 
618 (25.12) 
56.46 
 
11.97 (6.65) 
11.84 (6.71) 
  5.52 (6.89) 
 22.87 (15.10) 
19.46 (4.69) 
25.79 (5.53) 
 
  1.84  (4.42) 
  5.51 (9.25) 
20.79 (3.50) 
1260 
336 (26.67) 
59.29 
 
12.12 (6.58) 
11.84 (6.61) 
  5.23 (6.68) 
22.29 (14.36) 
      19.16 (4.67) 
25.77 (5.48) 
  1.40 (3.36) 
  4.19 (6.61) 
       20.56 (2.76) 
510 
170 (33.33) 
100 
 
-  
 9.65 (7.39) 
 5.03 (6.60) 
      19.71 (16.28) 
      20.06 (4.40) 
      24.69 (5.30) 
- 
- 
- 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. In the endogenous treatments, “number of leaders” indicates 
the number of candidates. 
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Table 3. Evolution of leaders' and followers' contributions over time in groups with a 
leader 
Periods Treatments Average leader candidates' 
contribution (1) 
Average followers' 
contribution (2) 
Ratio (1)/(2)
Sequence B-A-B    
1-10 
11-20 
21-30 
Benchmark 
Attribute 
Benchmark 
12.30 
12.05 
10.01 
6.92 
4.84 
3.73 
1.78 
2.58 
2.68 
Sequence A-B-A    
1-10 
11-20 
21-30 
Attribute 
Benchmark 
Attribute 
12.54 
11.80 
11.51 
6.44 
4.76 
4.06 
1.95 
2.48 
2.83 
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Table 4. The decision to lead (random-effect probit models) 
 
Endogenous treatments Attribute treatment Variable:  
Leader choice Coefficient Marginal effects Coefficient Marginal effects 
Attribute treatment 0.087 
(0.064) 
        0.024   
Period     -0.034*** 
 (0.003) 
  -0.009***     -0.033*** 
(0.006) 
      -0.009*** 
Gender (male=1)  0.384** 
 (0.181) 
        0.103**    0.394 
(0.283) 
       0.105 
Donation     0.002*** 
 (0.001) 
     0.0006***    0.003** 
(0.001) 
       0.0007** 
Donation * Gender   -0.002* 
(0.001) 
       -0.0006* -0.003* 
(0.001) 
      -0.0008* 
Donation * BIB 0.001 
(0.001) 
       0.0002   
Car ownership -0.143 
(0.159) 
       -0.038 -0.167 
(0.236) 
      -0.043 
Neuroticism  0.005 
(0.008) 
         0.001    0.015 
(0.011) 
       0.004 
Extraversion  -0.006 
(0.008) 
       -0.002  -0.015 
(0.012) 
      -0.004 
Openness      0.013* 
(0.007) 
       0.003*    0.009 
(0.011) 
       0.002 
Agreeableness  -0.009 
(0.008) 
       -0.002      -0.013 
  (0.012) 
      -0.003 
Conscientiousness  0.011 
(0.008) 
        0.003  0.012 
(0.012) 
       0.003 
Matched with 2 low donors 
 
   -0.208** 
(0.102) 
      -0.054** 
Matched with 2 high donors 
 
  0.222 
(0.158) 
       0.063 
Matched with 2 females 
 
 -0.104 
(0.116) 
      -0.027 
Matched with 2 males 
 
 0.062 
(0.120) 
       0.016 
Session dummies  Yes  Yes  
Constant -1.581 
(1.004) 
 -1.041 
(1.557) 
 
Observations 3720 1260 
Log-Likelihood -1726.992 -581.932 
Wald χ2  163.82 57.60 
Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. 
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Table 5. Determinants of the leader candidate's contribution (random-effect tobit 
models) 
 
Variable: leader 
candidate’s contribution 
    All treatments 
 
Endogenous  
treatments 
Attribute  
treatment 
Period           -0.215*** 
   (0.027) 
-0.216*** 
(0.026) 
-0.096** 
(0.047) 
Attribute treatment           1.348** 
          (0.640) 
1.308** 
       (0.606)  
Imposed-leader  
treatment 
         -1.418* 
          (0.774)   
Gender (=1 if male)            0.801 
(0.784) 
1.268 
(0.854) 
         0.729 
(1.391) 
Donation            0.006 
(0.004) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Donation*gender           -0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
Donation*BIB 0.004 
 (0.005) 
0.001 
(0.006)  
Car ownership             0.882 
 (0.693) 
0.670 
(0.747) 
0.527 
(1.175) 
Matched with 2 low 
donors   
        -2.774*** 
(0.902) 
Matched with 2 high 
donors   
0.831 
(1.302) 
Matched with 2 females 
  
-0.471 
(0.968) 
Matched with 2 males 
  
        -0.656 
(1.027) 
Personality factors Yes Yes Yes 
Session dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 14.707*** 
(3.918) 
16.012*** 
(4.112) 
    18.251** 
(7.336) 
Observations 1124 954 336 
Left censured obs.  
Right censured obs. 
99 
332 
58 
294 
11 
114 
Log-Likelihood -2835.842 -2407.131 -851.533 
Wald χ2  135.440 136.830 58.150 
Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
  Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. 
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Table 6. Determinants of a revision of the eliminated candidates' contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable: revision of 
contributions 
Ordered probit model GLS model 
Period 
 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.027 
(0.047) 
Attribute treatment 0.057 
(0.210) 
         -0.196 
(1.018) 
Actual leader’s contribution 0.073*** 
(0.013) 
      0.522*** 
(0.064) 
Gender (=1 if male) -0.382** 
(0.176) 
   -2.520*** 
(0.950) 
Donation 0.001 
(0.001) 
         -.0001 
(0.004) 
Car ownership 0.113 
(0.175) 
0.657 
(0.975) 
Personality Factors Yes Yes  
Session dummies Yes Yes 
Constant  -4.324 
(6.119) 
Observations 242 
Log-Likelihood -234.591  
R2 0.092 (pseudo) 0.294 
Wald χ2  51.040 89.540 
Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Note: Ordered probit model with robust standard errors.  *** significant at the 0.01 level, and ** at the 
0.05 level. 
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Table 7. Determinants of the follower’s contribution (Random-effects tobit models) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All treatments         Benchmark and Attribute treatments Variable: Follower’s 
contribution With leader All groups With leader 
Period 
 
     -0.317*** 
(0.030) 
-0.455*** 
     (0.027) 
         -0.274*** 
  (0.030) 
Attribute treatment 
 
-0.332 
(0.703) 
            -0.020 
    (0.565) 
-0.425 
(0.678)  
Imposed-leader treatment 
 
0.679 
(0.773)   
Leader in group 
  
       6.476*** 
 (0.503)  
Leader’s contribution 
  
0.614*** 
(0.040)  
     0.589*** 
(0.944) 
Eliminated leader 
       
       5.286*** 
 (0.786) 
      5.244*** 
(0.707)   
Gender (=1 if male) 
 
1.183* 
(0.691) 
0.176 
(0.634) 
0.213 
(0.753)   
Donation 
 
      0.014*** 
(0.004) 
      0.010*** 
(0.003) 
     0.009** 
(0.004) 
Donation*gender 
 
   -0.009** 
(0.005) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.005) 
Donation*BIB  
 
0.005 
(0.005) 
    0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
Car ownership 
 
-0.192 
(0.600) 
0.236 
(0.538) 
-0.080 
(0.642) 
Personality factors Yes Yes Yes 
Session dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
 
-0.629 
(4.001) 
3.781 
(3.590) 
0.110 
(4.273) 
Observations 1764 3008 1424 
Left censured obs. 854 (48%) 1906 (63%) 678 (48%) 
Right censured obs. 171 (10%) 180 (6%) 148 (10%) 
Log-Likelihood -3538.451 -4699.990 -2856.810 
Wald χ2  448.380 702.860 394.870 
Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: *** significant at the 0.01 level, and ** at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 8. Cluster analysis 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 All subjects 
Relative frequency of the 
decision to lead 
18.60 20.33 28.14 43.72 25.77 
Mean 1st stage contribution 
Mean 2nd stage contribution 
  4.83 
  1.62 
18.49 
  1.47 
10.90 
  4.10 
16.91 
  8.54 
10.62 
  3.91 
Mean donation 67.37 16.00 86.67 116.92 83.40 
Number of observations 38 (27%) 5 (4%) 60 (43%) 26 (18%) 141 
 
 38 
 
 33,1
23,3
17,7
35,8
23,9
21,7
10,0
15,0
20,0
25,0
30,0
35,0
40,0
Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 21-30
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 le
ad
er
 c
an
di
da
te
s
Benchmark
Attributes
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1. Evolution of the proportion of leader candidates by treatment 
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Fig.2a. Average actual contributions of females in the endogenous treatments 
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Fig.2b. Average actual contributions of males in the endogenous treatments 
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APPENDIX. Instructions for the Benchmark – Attributes - Benchmark sessions (other  
                      instructions available upon request) 
 
You are now taking part in an experiment on decision-making.  During this experiment, your earnings  
depend on your decisions and the decisions of others.  It is therefore important that you read these 
instructions with care. 
 
In most cases, the amounts evoked during this experiment are expressed in points.   The conversion rate 
of points into Euros is: 
80 points = 1 Euro 
During this session, your earnings in points will be put on your account, cumulated and converted to 
Euros.  The total amount of the compensation you will receive is confidential.  It will be paid in cash in 
private in a separate room  by a person who is not aware of the content of this experiment. 
 
All your decisions are anonymous. 
 
This session is divided into four parts.  The instructions relative to the parts 2 to 4 will be distributed later.  
------- 
Before starting the first part, we give you a show-up fee of €6.  With this show-up fee, you can put Euros 
on your account and make a donation to a charitable organization.  
 You can put Euros on your account.  The amount of the show-up fee that you put on your account 
will be added to your earnings made during this session and paid to you in cash at the end of the 
session.   
 You can make a donation to a charitable organization, among the three following: Handicap 
International, Médecins sans Frontières, ou UNICEF. You can find a description of each of these 
organizations in Appendix to these instructions. 
If so, your donation will be made in private at the end of the session in a box in the payment room in 
presence of a person who is not aware of the content of this experiment.  
We commit on our honor to give the entirety of these donations to these organizations.  If you want to 
receive personally a receipt justifying the payment of all the donations to the three associations, please fill 
out the form attached to these instructions.  
To make your decision, you are required to click one of the combinations displayed on your screen (from 
€0 for the donation and €6 put on your account, to a  €6 donation and €0 put on your account).   If you 
have chosen to make a donation, you will then indicate whom of the three organizations you want to give 
your donation to.   
The information on your donation can be disseminated, anonymously, to the other participants during this 
session, as follows:  
 A yellow disc indicates that your donation is higher than the average donation made by the participants 
to this session. 
 A grey disc indicates that your donation is equal to or lower than the average donation made by the 
participants to this session. 
You will also be requested to indicate your gender. This anonymous information is also liable to be 
disseminated to the other participants during the session. In all cases, you will be informed in the 
instructions preliminary to the dissemination of these pieces of information.  
 
First Part 
 
This part consists of 10 periods.  The participants are divided into groups of  three.  In each new period, 
the composition of your group is modified randomly.  
Decision-making in each period  
The three members belonging to a group can participate in a project, by constituting an amount that will 
be shared equally among them. This amount results from the individual contributions of the three group 
members.  
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In the beginning of each period, you receive an endowment of 20 points. 
Each period consists of two stages. 
 In the first stage, you decide if you are willing to make your contribution decision immediately or if 
you prefer to wait for the second stage.  
Make your decision immediately means that you choose in the first stage the amount of your contribution 
to the project. This amount can take any possible value between 0 and 20 points.  
The two other group members are informed on this contribution before making their own contribution 
decisions in the second stage. 
In the group, only one member can contribute in the first stage. Three cases can occur. 
¾ 1st case: only one member has chosen to make his contribution decision in the first stage. The 
procedure described above applies.  
¾ 2nd case: more than one member in the group have chosen to make their contribution decisions in 
the first stage. A random draw determines the one whose contribution is taken into account.  This 
random draw is independent on the chosen amount.  The one or those who have not been randomly 
drawn are informed; their first stage contribution is not accounted for and the other group members 
are not informed about this contribution; they move to the second stage and they can modify the 
contribution they had previously indicated.  Only those who were involved in the random draw and 
have not been drawn are informed about the existence of this random draw.   
¾ 3rd case: no member in the group has decided to contribute in the first stage. The three group 
members move directly to the second stage. 
 In the second stage, after being informed of the contribution made by the member who has made his 
decision in the first stage, if any, the group members who have not decided in the first stage choose 
simultaneously the amount of their endowment they contribute to the project, i.e. any value between 
0 and 20 points.  
After all members have made their decisions, each one in the group is informed about the amount of each 
member's contribution in the second stage, the total amount of the project and his own payoff for the 
current period.  
Calculation of your payoff in each period 
 Your income consist of two parts: 
¾ the amount of your endowment which you have kept for yourself (i.e. 20 points – your 
contribution to the project), 
¾ your income from the project: this income represents half of the total contribution of all 3 group 
members to the project, whatever your personal contribution.  In other words,   we increase the 
amount of the project by 50% of the contributions and the total amount of the project is shared 
equally among the members of the group. 
       Your total income is therefore calculated by the computer program as follows: 
 (20 points – your contribution to the project) 
+ 50% (total contributions to the project) 
The income of each group member is calculated in the same way, this means that each group member 
receives the same income from the project.  
For example, suppose the total contributions of all group members is 40 points. In this case each member 
of the group receives an income from the project of 1/2 (40) = 20 points. If the total contribution to the 
project is 5 points, then each member of the group receives an income of 1/2 (5) = 2.5 points from the 
project. 
For each point of your endowment that you keep for yourself you earn an income of 1 point. For every 
point you contribute to the project instead, the total contribution rises by one point. Your income from the 
project would rise by 1/2 (1) = 0.5 point. The income of the other group members would however also 
rise by 0.5 point each, so that the total income of the group from the project would rise by 1.5 point. Your 
 43 
 
contribution to the project therefore also raises the income of the other group members.  On the other 
hand you earn an income for each point contributed by the other members to the project.  For each point 
contributed by any member you earn 1/5 (1) = 0.5 point. 
 
It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants during the experiment.  If you violate this rule, 
you will be excluded from the experiment and from payments.  
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand.  We will immediately 
answer to your questions in private.  
* * * 
Second Part 
[These instructions were distributed at the end of the first 10 periods] 
This part consists of 10 periods. The participants are divided into groups of three. In each new period, the 
composition of your group is modified randomly.  
 
The rules for decision-making are the same as before, except for one thing. 
In the beginning of each period, you are informed about the attributes of each member of your group and 
the other members of your group are informed about your attributes. These anonymous attributes are your 
gender and the color corresponding to your donation (a yellow disc for a donation above the average 
donation made in the session and a grey disc for  a donation equal to or below the average).  
Each contribution, made either in the first or in the second stage, is displayed on your screen beside these 
attributes.  
The payoffs of each period are calculated like in the first part. 
* * * 
Third Part 
[These instructions were distributed at the end of the first 20 periods] 
 
This part consists of 10 periods. The participants are divided into groups of three. In each new period, the 
composition of your group is modified randomly. 
During this part, the instructions are those in use during the first part. 
 * * * 
Fourth Part 
 
This fourth part consists of a questionnaire comprising 60 affirmations.  Please read each of them 
carefully.  For each item, please circle that of the five boxes which fits your opinion best:  
 
Circle SD (Strongly Disagree) if the affirmation is quite wrong or if you strongly disagree. 
Circle D (Disagree) if the affirmation is rather wrong or if you disagree. 
Circle N (Neutral) if the affirmation is almost equally wrong or true or if you cannot choose or if have no 
opinion. 
Circle A (Agree) if the affirmation is rather true or if you agree. 
Circle SA (Strongly Agree) if the affirmation is quite true or if you strongly agree. 
 
There is no "good" or "bad" answer.  The aim of the questionnaire will be reached if you describe 
yourself and if you express your opinions as exactly as possible. Answer to each question.  If you made a 
mistake or if you change your mind, do not erase.  Put a X on the incorrect answer and circle the correct 
answer. 
You will earn 2 additional Euros for filling this questionnaire out. Your answers are of course still 
anonymous and will never be communicated to anyone.  I thank you for filling this questionnaire 
sincerely. 
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